Using the tools of Integrated Information Theory, we then show how the subjective properties of experienced space-its extendedness-can be accounted for in objective, neuroscientific terms by the “cause-effect structure” specified by the grid-like cortical area. However, these functional properties have nothing to say about the fact that a human fixating a stimulus would also “see” it-experience it at a location in space. Encoding, decoding, and tuning functions of model units illustrate the working of the model in a way that fully explains what the model does. Using standard neuroscience tools, we show how the model represents topographically the retinal position of a stimulus and triggers eye muscles to fixate or follow it. Here, we consider a simple model of how a “grid-like” network meant to resemble posterior cortical areas can represent spatial information and act on it to perform a simple “fixation” function. While useful for prediction, this functional, information-processing approach leaves out the subjective structure of experience: it does not account for how experience feels. Consciousness, too, is usually approached in functional terms: the goal is to understand how the brain represents information, accesses that information, and acts on it. Neuroscience has made remarkable advances in accounting for how the brain performs its various functions.
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